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“We’re Out Here Talking About Life and Death”: Reparations for Human Rights Violations in 
Vieques, Puerto Rico
Ryan Morgan
From 1941-2003, the U.S. Navy used the island of Vieques, which is inhabited by close to 10,000 
U.S. citizens, for war games, bombing exercises, and simulated aquatic landings. During those six 
decades, the bombardment of Vieques with both conventional and chemical weapons devastated the 
environment and created a massive health crisis. The health crisis is exacerbated by the extreme 
poverty on the island, much of which is also traceable to Navy policy there. Since 2003, several 
petitions and attempts for reparations for Vieques’ residents have been made to the Navy 
specifically and the US government generally, most notably a class action lawsuit in which more than 
three-quarters of Viequenses were named plaintiffs. Since that lawsuit’s dismissal in 2013, the 
question of reparations has again come to the foreground of Viequenses politics. The Navy, while 
conceding the facts of both the toxicity of their bombing exercises and the heightened health 
problems faced by Viequenses, consistently denies that there is a connection between the two. This 
thesis places that denial in the context of the Navy’s long-running obfuscation of its responsibilities 
to the Viequense people and, drawing on relevant human rights norms as well as other sources of 
reparation theory, argues that the Navy and US Government have a moral and legal obligation to 
provide comprehensive reparations to the people of Vieques.
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5“It was an exciting and a joyous moment for the people of Vieques, Puerto Rico, but I think for all the people who 
struggled, wherever those people may be, to get the U.S. Navy to leave, and for people all over the world to see a victory 
and to claim that victory…with that celebration, there’s also a caution. And that caution, I think, comes from the 
transfer of the land to the U.S. Department of Interior as opposed to giving the land back to the people of Vieques 
and, in essence, giving the people of Vieques their reparations. And those reparations need to come by giving the people 
back their land and also by the U.S. government doing intensive, massive cleanup of the land, that has depleted 
uranium, napalm, and God knows what other contaminants that continue to kill the people.”
-Rosa Clemente1
The activist and journalist Rosa Clemente spoke these words amidst the jubilation of May 1, 2003, 
the day that marked the end of the U.S. Navy’s bombing of the island of Vieques, Puerto Rico. Since 
1941, the Navy had used Vieques for live-fire bombing and amphibious landing exercises, war 
games, munitions storage, and waste disposal. The end of the bombing was a result of four years of 
continuous local civil disobedience combined with intense political pressure from global protests. 
Viequense people – the island is home to around 10,000 U.S. citizens – had resisted the Navy’s 
occupation of their land virtually from the beginning, but the 1999 death of David Sanes Rodríguez, 
a Viequense civilian contracted as a security guard by the Navy who was killed by an errant bomb 
during a routine exercise, attracted international attention. Protesters in Vieques constructed camps 
on the firing range to prevent bombing exercises, and many spent time in federal prison. 
Narrowly defined, the end of the bombing in Vieques represented the “success” of the 
movement. After more than a decade has passed since the bombing of Vieques stopped, though, the 
caution expressed by Rosa Clemente in 2003 seems prescient. The damage done to the island and its 
inhabitants during six decades of Navy exercises was immense, and has gone largely unaddressed by 
the Navy and U.S. Government in the ensuing years. Massive land expropriations in the 1940s 
served as a prelude to millions of tons of bombs and other weapons being dropped on the island. 
1 Interview on Democracy Now!, May 2, 2003. 
http://www.democracynow.org/2003/5/2/celebrations_continue_in_vieques_following_the
6The environmental devastation caused by the military exercises begat a persistent health crisis for the 
island’s residents, one that is exacerbated by the absence of adequate medical facilities there. The 
Navy, as a matter of policy, actively opposed economic development of Vieques, with predictable 
consequences: Vieques is the poorest municipality in Puerto Rico, with fully a quarter of Viequense 
households living on less than $10,000 a year, and nearly half of the island’s residents living under 
the poverty line.2 Combined, these crises amount to serious and prolonged violations of Viequense 
human rights and their consequences continue to weigh heavily on the islanders’ lives.  
To date, in spite of consistent claims for reparations by Viequenses for the various harms 
perpetrated on them by the Navy’s activities on the island, none have been offered or given. In part, 
this is a result of the Navy’s continued denial that its activities on Vieques are responsible for its 
health and economic crises. That denial is aided by a series of reports from the Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), a federal agency tasked with studying public health, 
which “could not identify a relationship between military activities and health problems experienced 
by the island’s residents.”3 
The Navy expropriated about two-thirds of Vieques in 1941, before Pearl Harbor, but 
nevertheless in anticipation of U.S. entry into the Second World War.4 A second wave of 
expropriations, justified as necessary for national interests in the burgeoning Cold War, occurred in 
1947-48. By 1948, the Navy controlled a little more than three-quarters of Vieques.5 The entire 
Viequense population was forcibly relocated to the remaining land in the center of the island. Today, 
the federal government (represented by both the Navy itself and the Department of Fish and 
2 U.S. Census Bureau, 2009-2013 5-Year American Community Survey
3 ATSDR, “Vieques Overview.” http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/sites/vieques/overview.html
4 Plans for a naval base in Puerto Rico began in earnest in 1939, and construction on Roosevelt Roads – the base in Ceiba, on 
mainland Puerto Rico, from which Vieques exercises were carried out – began in 1940. The first wave of expropriations in Vieques 
was part of this larger plan for Puerto Rico. For more, see:  Marie Cruz Soto, “Inhabiting Isla Nena, 1514-2003: Island Narrations, 
Imperial Dramas, and Vieques, Puerto Rico” (PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, 2008): 193-195, and César J. Ayala and José 
L. Bolívar, Battleship Vieques: Puerto Rico from World War II to the Korean War (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2011): Chapters 
1 and 3. 
5 25,353 acres out of a total of 33,649. Cruz Soto, “Inhabiting Isla Nena”, 196.
7Wildlife) still controls most of the former Navy lands, and fully half of Vieques remains off-limits to 
Viequense people.
During the 60 years of bombing and exercises in Vieques, the Navy dropped thousands of 
tons of bombs on the island.6 In 2009, the environmental scientists James W. Porter, James V. 
Barton, and Cecilia Torres presented a paper to a meeting of the NATO program Science for Peace 
and Security, coincidentally held in Vieques. Their paper collects the best estimates for the amount 
of weaponry dropped on the island, which they call “staggering.”7 Their research shows that 662 
million pounds of bombs were dropped over the course of the Navy’s occupation, of which two 
million remain as unexploded ordinance underwater.8 In addition, they calculate that 7000 pounds of 
rocket fuel and 100,000 gallons of oil leaked onto the island. Besides the mass of conventional 
weapons, the Navy at different times used napalm, Agent Orange, white phosphorous, and depleted 
uranium in Vieques. The combined effect of these exercises has been environmental devastation 
such that nearly the whole of Vieques has, since the end of the bombing, been declared a Superfund 
site, the largest of its kind.9 Prior to the listing of Vieques as a Superfund site, a 2000 agreement 
between the Navy and the government of Puerto Rico had mandated Navy cleanup of 12 
contaminated sites on the island.10 An additional 40 sites were identified by mid-2005.11 As of 2015, 
the cleanup of Vieques is ongoing, and perpetually underfunded. According to Robert Rabin, a 
Viequense resident who was one of the leaders of the movement against the Navy occupation:
While the cleanup is taking—has taken over 10 years so far, they’re only scratching 
the surface. This is a process that we believe is happening with no real supervision, 
no genuine community participation. We believe the military is really not interested 
6 Parts of this paragraph are paraphrased from a term paper I wrote for Professor Jon Bush in Spring 2015.
7 J.W. Porter, et al., “Ecological, Radiological, and Toxicological Effects of Naval Bombardment on the Coral Reefs of Isla de 
Vieques, Puerto Rico” in Warfare Ecology: A New Synthesis for Peace and Security, edited by Gary E. Machlis, et al. (Dordrecht, 
Netherlands: Springer, 2009): 65-124.
8 All figures from Ibid., 68 (table 1). 
9 The EPA’s “Superfund Site Profile” can be found here: http://cumulis.epa.gov/supercpad/cursites/csitinfo.cfm?id=0204694
10 Sherrie L. Bayer, “Environmental Justice and the Cleanup of Vieques.” CENTRO: The Journal of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies 18, 
no. 1 (2006): 100-100.
11 Ibid., 101
8in cleaning up Vieques, and rather interested in continuing to punish Vieques for 
having thrown the U.S. Navy out in 2003.12
The destruction of the Viequense environment is inextricably linked with extraordinary damage to 
Viequense health.13 The cancer rate in Vieques was 27% higher than among the overall Puerto Rican 
population in 2000.14 Despite the fact that infant mortality rates are on a decline in Puerto Rico, they 
increased 12% in Vieques in 2007.15 In addition to the chemicals present in the toxic triad of Agent 
Orange, napalm, and depleted uranium, the shelling of Vieques has left extraordinary levels of 
everything from aluminum and arsenic to lead and mercury in the bodies of Viequense people. 
Besides the cancer and infant mortality rates, this had led to heightened rates of hypertension, lower 
birth rates, and a host of other health problems. Some of those contaminations are passed from 
mother to child in utero, so the health crisis in Vieques is an intergenerational one, and it is 
reasonable to suspect that some of the victims of the Navy bombing are not yet born. For those 
who are, they are born onto the municipality with the highest rates of teenage pregnancy, 
prematurity, and infant mortality in Puerto Rico.
Poverty in Vieques exacerbates the health crises – all of the above issues occur on an island 
without a functioning hospital. The hospital that had existed there succumbed to a project of 
privatization of medical services in Puerto Rico during the mid-1980s, and became nothing more 
than a “glorified first-aid station.” 16 As a result, residents who are suffering from any of the myriad 
severe health problems prominent in Vieques (to say nothing of people who have other medical 
emergencies) have to take a lengthy ferry ride to Fajardo, on the main island of Puerto Rico, to 
receive proper treatment. Further complicating access to health care for Viequenses is the fact that, 
12 Robert Rabin, Interview on Democracy Now!, May 2, 2013.
13 Parts of this paragraph are paraphrased from a term paper I wrote for Professor David Scott in Fall 2014.
14 José Javier Colón Morera and José E. Rivera Santana, “New Dimensions in Civil Society Mobilization: The Struggle for Peace in 
Vieques” in Puerto Rico under Colonial Rule: Political Persecution and the Quest for Human Rights edited by Ramón Bosque-Pérez and José 
Javier Colón Morera. (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006): 214.
15 Victor Torres-Vélez, “The Hidden Wounds of Vieques: A Political Ecology of Disease and Collective Actions in a Militarized 
Landscape” (PhD dissertation, Michigan State University, 2007): 3. 
16 Katherine T. McCaffrey, Military Power and Popular Protest: The U.S. Navy in Vieques, Puerto Rico (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Univ. 
Press, 2002): 120.
9as of 2011, only 61% of them had health insurance, and more than 60% of those who did were on 
either Medicare or Medicaid.17 
The issue of Viequense poverty is further linked to the Viequense health crisis because they 
spring from the same source – the Navy’s occupation. The Navy actively opposed economic 
development for the civilian sector during their years of possession.18 In addition, contamination of 
the water devastated the livelihood of Viequense fishermen, who were deeply involved in 
movements against the Navy presence from the late 1970s on.19 These things, of course, only 
followed the initial expropriations, which denied Viequense people access to some of the most 
fertile and choicest grazing lands on the island. In the years since the end of the bombing, 
multinational corporations have begun developing Vieques for tourism and speculators have begun 
purchasing land that local people, as a result of the decades of enforced economic stagnation, cannot 
afford. Among the chief concerns for Viequenses at the present time is the possibility that outside 
investment that is sold to them as “development” will in fact be poorly disguised gentrification – 
improved services in Vieques do not serve the victims of the bombing if they get priced off of the 
island.
Almost immediately after the cessation of bombing, discussion of reparations for the 
Vieques’ inhabitants began.20 Victor Torres-Vélez, who has done extensive work on the 
environmental and health catastrophes on the island, reported on that discussion in his PhD 
dissertation:
There are no doubts that Viequenses need both access to health services and 
reparation for the Navy’s misdeeds. However, there are differences of opinion on 
exactly what is the most appropriate way of attaining these common goals. These 
17 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Vieques, Puerto Rico: A Health Care Needs Assessment for the President’s Task 
Force on Puerto Rico’s Status.” February, 2013. See chart on Page 30. 
http://www.noticel.com/uploads/gallery/documents/Vieques_PR_A_Health_Care_Services_Needs_Assessment_-
_February_2013.pdf
18 McCaffrey, Military Power and Popular Protest: 3-5.
19 Ibid., Chapter 3.
20 Some of the next four paragraphs are paraphrased from a paper I wrote for Professor Jon Bush in Spring 2015.
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tensions are best exemplified in the discussions between civil action lawyers and 
activists from different groups. From these debates, it becomes evident that while a 
civil action suit might provide some alternatives, these might fall short of 
Viequenses’ needs. This contention comes from the clash between the inherent 
limitations of a socially atomizing legal system and activists’ holistic understanding of 
Vieques’ situation.21
In the end, Viequenses formed a consensus around the decision to file a series of civil suits against 
the Navy. The largest of those suits, Sanchez v. United States, was filed on behalf of 7,125 Viequenses, 
representing more than 75% of Vieques’ population. In February 2012, it was rejected by the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision.22 The Supreme Court rejected a petition to hear the 
plaintiffs’ appeal in 2013.
While Sanchez is so far the most substantial attempt to secure reparations for the harms of 
the Navy’s occupation of Vieques, other legal challenges have gone forward since its dismissal. Of 
particular note is a September 2013 petition filed before the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights. While the United States has shown historical reluctance to abide by the rulings and 
recommendations of the Inter-American Commission, the petition is a powerful tool to put pressure 
on the government to provide reparation to Viequenses. The petition, by relying on the moral 
authority and relative political weight of customary international law, could give the United States a 
political incentive to fulfill its obligations of redress.
Residents of Vieques have remained active in their demands for redress, even and especially 
in the wake of the Sanchez setback. A brochure released in March 2015 by Vieques Vive, La Lucha 
Continua, a local activist group founded in 2013 to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the 
closing of the Navy base and the cessation of bombing, enumerates contemporary demands for 
21 Victor Torres-Vélez, “The Hidden Wounds of Vieques: A Political Ecology of Disease and Collective Actions in a Militarized 
Landscape” (PhD dissertation, Michigan State University, 2007): 153.
22 Sanchez was filed under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which provides exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Specifically, 
the First Circuit ruled that the claim made by the Viequense plaintiffs did not mean the criteria to be considered one such exception. 
This is discussed at greater length below. 
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justice based around the “four D’s” of demilitarization, decontamination, devolution (return of the 
lands), and development.23 
This thesis discusses the possibilities for and barriers to achieving a comprehensive 
reparations package for the people of Vieques for the harms suffered during the Navy occupation of 
the island. In doing so, it draws on reparations theory and practice from a diverse set of sources, 
including cases for reparations for new world slavery, transitional justice conceptions of reparations, 
and international human rights. It is divided into three parts. In part one, I examine domestic and 
international norms relevant to the Viequense reparation cause, and provide a defense for the use of 
these tools in building the case for reparations.
In part two, I trace the history of the Navy’s denial of its responsibilities for the crises in 
Vieques through key moments during and after the bombing, showing a concerted pattern of 
obfuscation and willful denial. This is followed, in part three, by an analysis of the post-2003 
attempts to achieve reparations, particularly the Sanchez case and the Inter-American Commission 
petition. Part three also includes discussion about the strengths and weaknesses in different 
approaches to reparations post-Sanchez: legal v. political, collective v. individual, and forward-looking 
v. backward-looking reparations. Using the “four D’s” as a basis, the third section also identifies 
necessary elements for a successful reparations policy for Vieques. 
Because of its focus on the period of 1941-2003, this thesis is necessarily limited in how it 
identifies the harms perpetrated against the people of Vieques. I will be discussing the harms 
perpetrated by the Navy occupation alone, but the harms in Vieques run much deeper and begin 
much earlier than that. There is no separating the harms of the bombing from the general context of 
the colonial relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico. 24 The Navy presence in 
23 Vieques Vive, La Lucha Continua Brochure. “The Struggle Continues in Vieques.” Copy in possession of the author. In English, 
their name means Vieques Lives, The Struggle Continues.
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Vieques has been only one manifestation of that colonial relationship; Vieques’ history is one of 
colonial domination with corresponding violations of human rights beginning well before 1941, and 
continuing after the bombs stopped falling. 
Like the rest of Puerto Rico, Vieques has been a colony of either Spain or the United 
States since the late 15th Century.  Even an extensive reparations programs that addressed all of 
the ills directly associated with Navy bombing would not begin to address the underlying 
conditions that made Navy expropriation without appropriate compensation or consent 
possible.25 
Beyond the larger theoretical and practical issues related to the very idea of human rights in a 
colonial territory, the role of Vieques is particular in Puerto Rican history – it has spent centuries as 
a “colony of a colony” under both Spanish and American rule.26 The role of Vieques’ double 
colonial status in its devastation at the hands of the U.S. Navy is immense. Even at a time when 
Puerto Rican officials from across the political spectrum were demanding the Navy’s departure from 
Vieques, and a non-binding referendum showed nearly 70% local support for the immediate 
cessation of bombing, the ultimate decision rested in the hands of a Congress and President that 
Viequenses and Puerto Ricans had no hand in electing. 
 In sum, the roughly 10,000 residents of Vieques are, politically and socially, hugely 
marginalized within the U.S. body politic, and while a reparations program for the harms suffered 
under Navy occupation would do something to assuage that, it would not and could not solve these 
larger problems. 
24 Legally, Puerto Rico is a “Commonwealth” and “unincorporated territory” of the United States. This was decided and codified by 
the so-called insular cases in the early part of the 20th century, during the first decades of U.S. occupation of Puerto Rico. Puerto 
Ricans were granted U.S. citizenship by the Jones Act of 1917. It is widely understood to exist nevertheless as a colonial territory 
whose people possess “colonial citizenship” by scholars of Puerto Rican Studies. See, for example, the special section in the Spring 
2013 issue of CENTRO: The Journal of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies on the topic of “Puerto Rico, the United States and the Making 
of a Bounded Citizenship.” (Vol. XXV, no. 1.)
25 A variation of this sentence first appeared in a term paper I wrote for Prof. David Scott in Fall 2014. 
26 McCaffrey, Military Power and Popular Protest, 10.
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This is not to say that the insufficiency of reparations for the Navy exercises and bombing 
makes them meaningless. It would be callous to imagine that Viequenses should wait for redress for 
centuries of colonial rule before remedy could be applied to the urgent environmental, economic, 
and health problems facing the community. In short, reparations for the ill effects of the Navy 
presence in Vieques are necessary but insufficient. It would be unhelpful to focus on the 
insufficiency at the expense of the necessity.
It is also worth addressing one other potential objection to a focus on Vieques: the 
placement of Vieques and Viequenses among the many groups to whom reparations are due from 
the United States government.27 J. Angelo Corlett claims that “so long as cases for oppression and 
reparations are made on reasonably clear evidence, then those groups that were oppressed first and 
worst should be at the top of the list to receive reparations.”28 By this he means that it would be 
“unfair for those who were oppressed subsequent to and less than” African Americans and Native 
Americans to receive reparations before those groups.29 In the first place, both the temporal 
question and the question of who was oppressed the “worst” are deeply complicated in the case of 
Vieques, which came under US rule in 1898 along with the rest of Puerto Rico, but counts native 
genocide and slavery as part of its history the same as the mainland United States. Beyond that, 
though, I am not convinced it is useful. Making the case for reparations for Viequenses in no way 
trivializes the same claims for other groups, and I would argue that it would be, to use Corlett’s 
word, “unfair” to Viequenses to ignore their rightful claims to reparation until the reparation claims 
Corlett considers “more” right are satisfied. To that end, I am making the case for Viequense 
reparations on its own merit, independently of its relationship to other cases against the United 
States. 
27 Much of the following paragraph is paraphrased from the same term paper mentioned in footnote 26.
28 J. Angelo Corlett, Heirs of Oppression (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010): 16-17.
29 Ibid., 17. 
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Part One: The Right to Redress for Destruction of Environment and Health
Practitioners and scholars of human rights have recognized a universal right to redress for 
human rights violations since the publication of the field’s foundational documents. Article 8 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights establishes that “Everyone has the right to an effective 
remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by 
the constitution or by law.” 
In more recent times, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution enumerating the “basic 
guidelines and principles on the right to remedy and redress” for gross violations of human rights, 
international law, and international humanitarian law.30 The continued codification of the right to 
reparation, as evidenced by that resolution, has also been upheld in numerous domestic and 
international legal cases, and is a primary feature of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court.31 Further, reparations are a one of the four key pieces of “comprehensive transitional justice 
policy.”32 The rise of transitional justice as a field has been hugely influential on the development of 
international norms, and it has further solidified the normative value of reparations that they are 
incorporated into transitional justice mechanisms. The International Center for Transitional Justice 
(ICTJ), an NGO founded under UN auspices in 2001, summarizes the justification and necessity of 
reparations as follows:
30 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human 
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 
60/147 of 16 December 2005.
31 In addition to establishing the ICC’s ability to enforce the payment of reparations during trials in Article 75 (2), the Rome Statute 
established a Trust Fund for Victims in Article 79 that allows reparations payment to come from the international community through 
the Court itself. 
32 The other three are criminal prosecutions, institutional reforms, and truth-telling mechanisms. International Center for Transitional 
Justice, “What is Transitional Justice?” https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice
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States have a legal duty to acknowledge and address widespread or systematic human 
rights violations, in cases where the state caused the violations or did not seriously 
try to prevent them.
Reparations initiatives seek to address the harms caused by these violations. They 
can take the form of compensating for the losses suffered, which helps overcome 
some of the consequences of abuse. They can also be future oriented—providing 
rehabilitation and a better life to victims—and help to change the underlying causes 
of abuse.
Reparations publicly affirm that victims are rights-holders entitled to redress.33
Much of the ICTJ’s conceptual framework applies to Vieques. The violations to Viequense human 
rights represented by the military exercises were unquestionably widespread and systematic. Much of 
the prescriptive framework is useful, too, in the Vieques case. Compensation and rehabilitation are 
both entirely worthy aims for Viequense reparations. In addition, because of their citizenship status 
as residents of Puerto Rico and their relative invisibility within the U.S. body politic, there is 
undoubtedly a great need for and a great value to be gained from public affirmation that the people 
of Vieques are “rights-holders entitled to redress.” Most of that value is forward-looking, based on 
the hope that the recognition of Viequenses as such would provide for them more recourse in the 
future than they have had to this point within the American body politic. That affirmation is 
important, but insufficient. Reparation in Vieques must transcend the merely symbolic – damage 
must be undone, and it must be undone urgently.
There is also precedent for practitioners of international law, as well as diplomatic, political, 
and legal bodies, to accept claims for reparations for environmental damages and violations of the 
right to health. The right to health is established in a substantial number of human rights treaties, 
declarations and norms, beginning with Article 25 of the UDHR:
33 International Center for Transitional Justice, “Reparations”. https://www.ictj.org/our-work/transitional-justice-issues/reparations
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(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical 
care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of 
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance 34
It seems unthinkable - and certainly incompatible with the United States’ responsibilities under 
Article 25 - that U.S. citizens would live in such extraordinary poverty. It is also hard to square the 
cancer rates and other health crises with US obligations to provide a standard of living including 
health care, and to square the infant mortality rates with US obligations under section two.35
Human rights law and norms as they apply to environmental protection are more 
complicated, but have gained some substantial ground in international courts and human rights 
declarations. For example, one of the categories of reparations, mandated by the United Nations, to 
be paid by Iraq to Kuwait after the first Gulf War was for environmental damages.36 The Rome 
Statute for the ICC names as a war crime an attack that takes place with the knowledge that it will 
cause “long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.”37 The petition brought on 
behalf of Viequenses before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights focuses some of its 
argument on the Stockholm Declaration of 1972, which, while not a treaty and therefore non-
binding, is nevertheless “legally significant. The articulation of global values and policies it represents 
was a prerequisite to establishing international legal norms.”38
As ever when discussing the applicability of international law and norms to cases involving 
the United States, the value of human rights instruments and precedents is more normative than 
34 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25.
35 For a very good discussion of health concerns on Vieques from a human rights perspective, see Maria Idalí Torres, “Organizing, 
Educating, and Advocating for Health and Human Rights in Vieques, Puerto Rico.” American Journal of Public Health 95, no. 1 (January 
2005): 5-12. 
36 Details about those claims are available here: http://www.uncc.ch/category-f
37 Rome Statute, Article 8, Sec. 2 (b)(iv)
38 Dinah Shelton, “Stockholm Declaration (1972) and Rio Declaration (1992)” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
Section B.4(21). Online resource. http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1608
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practicable. The United States has rarely considered itself bound by international law or human 
rights norms, least of all when it comes to domestic situations. It is not a signatory to the Rome 
Statute, nor has it behaved at any point as though the Stockholm Declaration guides its behavior. 
The value, then, of citing human rights precedents and establishing patterns of international norms 
is that it gives supporters of Viequense reparations tools they can use to put pressure on the Navy, 
and the U.S. government more generally. 
The relevance of political pressure and moral high ground is particularly salient given the 
experience of the movement that led to the cessation of bombing and exercises in 2003. First in 
Puerto Rico, and then in the mainland United States, the issue of ending the bombing became a 
cross-political one. Independence Party leader Ruben Berríos was among those arrested for camping 
on the target ranges.39 In 1999, Governor Pedro Rosselló – an advocate of statehood for the island – 
testified before the Senate Armed Forces Committee demanding the end to live-fire exercises in 
Vieques.40 In January 2000, the candidate for the governorship from the party that prefers a variation 
on the current status, Sila Calderón, repeatedly told the National Press Club that Vieques 
represented a major human rights problem.41
The resonance of the Viequense plight across seemingly irreconcilable political positions was 
echoed again during the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election. As Charles Swift, then an attorney for the 
commanding officer at Roosevelt Roads, put it:
The following four people have never agreed on anything in their lives as far as I 
know—Rudy Giuliani, Hillary Clinton, George [W.] Bush the younger and Al Gore. 
Can you think of anything that those four people could agree on? There was one 
exception. They agreed on one thing, that the Navy should close its bombing range 
on Vieques, Puerto Rico.42
39 McCaffrey, Military Power and Popular Protest, 168-169.
40 Ivan Roman, "Rossello Wins Praise with Vieques Stand." Orlando Sentinel, October 25, 1999: 
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1999-10-25/news/9910250046_1_inhofe-puerto-rico-vieques.
41A full transcript of her remarks can be found here:  http://www.puertorico-herald.org/issues/vol4n05/CalderonTranscript-en.html
42 Charles D. Swift, interviewed by Ronald J. Gerle. The Reminiscences of Charles D. Swift. Rule of Law Oral History Project, Columbia 
University Center for Oral History, 2011: p.80.
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That consensus was formed precisely on the basis of political pressure and appeals to moral and 
human rights propositions. Then, as now, members of both the political and military establishments 
fought intensely against the protesters and their supporters. That the pressure worked from 1999-
2003 does not indicate, of course, that it will work again for the cause of reparations. There are ways 
in which the challenge of getting the Navy or the U.S. Government more broadly to accept their 
obligation to pay reparations to the people of Vieques is even greater than the challenge to close the 
bombing range. The biggest obstacle to the efforts to achieve reparations to this point has been the 
Navy’s refusal to accept its responsibility for the human crises on the island. 
Part Two: Accepting the Facts, Denying the Truth: The U.S. Government Position
In Vieques, the essential tension between facts and truth has been for decades the basis of 
the Navy’s denial of the effects of its activities on the island. The Navy’s position now does not deny 
the facts of its long-term bombing, including its use of chemical weapons, nor the large 
concentrations of heavy metals in the island’s air, soil, and water. Indeed, the Navy does not even 
deny the concentrations of heavy metals in the bodies of the island’s residents, nor the fact that 
there are high rates of innumerable health maladies on the island. In short, the Navy concedes the 
bombing, and it concedes the health crisis. What the Navy denies, however, is the connection 
between the two. The denial is made easier by the reports from the ATSDR, which corroborate the 
Navy’s position by consistently failing to find any linkage between bombing and health outcomes. 
(The ATSDR’s 2013 report, for example, approvingly quotes a study from the Puerto Rican 
Department of Health that blamed cigarettes and hair dye as “possible sources for some but not all 
the elevated levels” of mercury, aluminum, lead, uranium, cadmium, nickel and arsenic found in 
their testing.)43
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The ATSDR’s findings are deeply problematic as science, as several independent scientists 
and studies have shown, and their problems are exacerbated for the question of reparations by the 
fact that they are widely accepted by U.S. government agencies, including the First Circuit Court, 
which cited ATSDR reports in its decision on the Sanchez suit. 
A number of independent scientists have done excellent work dismantling the ATSDR 
reports’ usefulness as scientific documents, which I will discuss in more detail later on, but I will first 
frame the Navy’s current denials in the historical context of its public positions on Vieques during 
key moments of the occupation. The Navy’s denial of the connection between the bombing and the 
health crisis is completely in line with the Navy’s public assertions of its position in Vieques during 
the past several decades. The specifics of the Navy defense of its presence on an inhabited island 
have changed, but the basic fact of it has not. The Navy has consistently perpetuated a narrative of 
itself as a benevolent ruler in Vieques, always alongside arguments about the necessity of Vieques 
and the entire Roosevelt Roads complex for national defense. When the political situation 
surrounding the end of the bombing in 2003 made such a position untenable, their position 
predictably changed to one of denial of responsibility in the face of claims for reparation. 
In 1980, during a hearing held by the House Armed Services Committee, Secretary of the 
Navy Edward Hidalgo said about the role of the Navy in Vieques, “The positive effects upon 
Vieques of the Navy’s activities over these long years have been many, upon the economy, the 
ecology, the fishing, yes, and the good will among people.” 44 Two years before, a wave of protests in 
Vieques following a successful movement to stop Navy exercises on the nearby island of Culebra 
43 Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, An Evaluation Of Environmental, 
Biological, and Health Data from the Island of Vieques (“ATSDR 2013 Report”), Puerto Rico, March 19, 2013: p.63-64.
44 “Naval Training Activities on the Island of Vieques, Puerto Rico.” Hearings before the Panel to Review the Status of Navy Training 
on the Island of Vieques of the Committee on Armed Services. US House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress, Second Session. 
May 28, 29, July 10, 11, September 24, 1980: p.4. (“House Committee Hearings.”)
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had prompted the Committee to hold the hearings.45 Katherine McCaffrey outlines the crucial 
historical context:
Vieques’ long-simmering conflict with the navy exploded in 1978. The navy 
intensified maneuvers on Vieques after a militant anticolonial movement on 
neighboring Culebra forced the military off that island. Heightened bombing and 
stepped-up maneuvers pushed conflict over the edge. A grassroots mobilization 
coalesced in Vieques in the late 1970s that aimed to evict the navy and reclaim land.46
The mobilization in 1978 was a critical moment in the history of relations between the Navy and the 
people of Vieques. A number of factors led to the explosiveness of that confrontation, which 
McCaffrey calls “The Fishermen’s War” for the primary position Viequense fishermen played in the 
protests. The end of the bombing of Culebra emboldened local Viequense activists, while 
simultaneously causing the Navy to increase its activities in Vieques to make up for the loss of its 
sister island, which “created particular hardship for the island’s fishermen.”47 This hardship was 
manifest in myriad ways, from the increasing contamination of prime fishing waters and reefs to the 
physical destruction of buoys, traps, and other fishing gear, to new restrictions on movement that 
denied fishermen access to the waters they had previously worked.48 Rafael Cruz, the president of 
the fishing association in Vieques, explained the reasons for the 1978 protests to McCaffrey, framing 
the particular conflict in the larger context of the problems caused by the Navy’s presence on the 
island:
The struggle began in 1978 because for years Vieques had been mistreated by the 
Navy. Women were raped. Men were killed in the streets fighting sailors in years 
back. I lost a friend on the base when a bomb exploded. But they continued with the 
abuse and the abuse eventually reached the sector of the fishermen. They bombed 
the most productive fishing areas. Dropped live bombs. Destroyed many fishing 
traps…The situation in Vieques is that the fishers have families to support…It’s the 
only source of steady employment in Vieques. And here comes the navy saying for 
thirty days, you can’t fish. This is terrible.49




49 Quoted in Ibid., 76.
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About a year prior to Secretary Hidalgo’s testimony, in May of 1979, federal marshals arrested 21 
protesters who had gathered on military land to demonstrate. Many of the arrested protesters were 
given fines and sentenced to six-month terms in federal prison by Judge Juan Torruella.50 Although 
the protesters came from various political and ideological backgrounds, the Puerto Rican and US 
governments engaged in a targeted campaign of arrests against independentistas.51 Among those 
arrested was Angel Rodríguez Cristóbal, a Vietnam veteran and independence activist whose case 
would become emblematic for the movement. Rodríguez was among those who received the 
maximum six-month jail term, but it was what happened after he went to prison that ensured his 
place in Viequense memory. As McCaffrey recounts:
On November 11, 1979, two months into a six-month sentence, Rodríguez was 
found dead in his prison cell. Prison officials declared the death a suicide, but an 
independent autopsy the family had performed concluded that he was beaten to 
death. Photos of the cadaver showed that the face was heavily bruised, inconsistent 
with charges of suicide by strangulation.52 
A few weeks later, on December 4th, 1979, a bus transporting Navy personnel in Sabana Seca, a town 
just outside San Juan, was ambushed by armed gunmen. Two sailors were killed and ten others 
wounded. Literature left behind by independentista groups claiming responsibility indicated that the 
massacre was, in part, an act of retaliation for Rodríguez’s death. 
It was against this backdrop that the House Armed Services Committee held its hearings, 
and Secretary Hidalgo gave his testimony. His assertion that the Navy presence benefited the 
Viequense people’s “economy, ecology, and fishing” went unsubstantiated in his testimony, which 
turned very quickly to the question of national security. As would be the case in future defenses of 
the Navy’s presence in Vieques, the Secretary positioned Vieques as critical for U.S. interests in the 
Caribbean and the world at large, while dismissing the protesters as, in his words, “noisy dissenters 
50 Judge Torruella would later write the dissenting opinion in Sanchez.
51 LL Cripps, Human Rights in a United States Colony (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Books, Inc., 1982): 120-132.
52 Ibid., 90.
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with a political or ideological ax to grind.”53 Katherine McCaffrey explains the particular historical 
context in which the Fishermen’s War took place:
Protest erupted at a time of increasing international polarization. In the late 1970s, 
cold war tensions intensified between the United States and the Soviet Union after 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A wave of revolutionary movements swept 
Central America and the Caribbean basin, heightening Washington’s anxiety about 
the spread of communism and the growing influence of Cuba throughout the region. 
With U.S. public consciousness shaped by grim images of the hostages in Iran, the 
political establishment turned markedly to the right.54
For Secretary Hidalgo and other Navy officials, the heightening Cold War served as the central 
defense for the continued presence in and bombing of Vieques. In his testimony, he touched on all 
the major developments highlighted above by McCaffrey:
The aggressive Soviet satellite in the heart of the Caribbean is strikingly relevant to 
this panel’s deliberations. So is the strength of the Soviet Navy, with its ever-rising 
numbers of combatant ships…The burden upon our Navy is heavier than it has 
been since World War II and, in some respects, Mr. Chairman, than in World War II.
The heroic Iranian rescue mission of April 24 dramatically illustrates the decisive 
effect of unforeseen or unforeseeable obstacles even when the preparations and 
training have been painstaking…Anything that deprives our Nation of the Vieques 
training range or jeopardizes its use would be a severe blow to our national security. I 
am confident you will not let this happen.55
Having paid lip service to the concerns of Viequense fishermen and other residents, Secretary 
Hidalgo here gets to the heart of his defense of the bombing of Vieques. The strategic value of 
Vieques – as a training center to prepare for global threats, but also as a bulwark against perceived 
Cuban aggressiveness in the Caribbean (Secretary Hidalgo would not even mention “the aggressive 
Soviet satellite state in the heart of the Caribbean” by name,) would supersede the concerns of the 
inhabitants of the island.56 Those who disagreed, and particularly those who protested had to be 
understood as a tiny, radical, anti-American minority. The concerns expressed by Rafael Cruz and 
53 House Committee Hearings, p. 4.
54 McCaffrey, Military Power and Popular Protest, 67-68.
55 House Committee Hearings, 4-5. 
56 In 1981, for example, Vieques was used by NATO as a staging ground for dress rehearsal for the invasion of Granada. See David 
Scott, Omens of Adversity: Tragedy, Time, Memory, Justice (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014), 182n48.
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the fishermen were dismissed as so much “demagogic noise.”57 (The notion of Viequense protesters 
as demagogues with an ideological ax to grind is difficult to square with, among many other things, 
several leaders of the fishing association identifying with the pro-American statehood party. The 
movement as a whole included independentista and socialist elements, but was self-consciously pan-
political, in contrast to the genuinely independentista movement in Culebra.)58
Neither Secretary Hidalgo nor most Navy officers and spokespeople over the years, 
however, would simply make the argument that, if the price of maintaining U.S. supremacy in the 
Cold War and anti-Cuban hegemony in the Caribbean was the livelihoods of a few hundred 
Viequense fishermen (or the health of a few thousand Viequense residents), that it was worth 
paying. Instead, unsubstantiated and unexamined claims about the ways in which the Navy was 
actually good for the people of Vieques were espoused. 
In 1999, the policy of obfuscation of the Navy’s responsibility for the wellbeing of people in 
Vieques was on full display. It was, once again, subservient to an overall narrative of the necessity of 
Vieques and Roosevelt Roads for national security. On September 22 and October 19, 1999, the 
Senate Sub-Committee on Readiness and Management Support, which operates under the Senate 
Committee on Armed Services, held hearings that were strongly reminiscent of those held by the 
House Committee in 1980. Once again, the hearings were held in the wake of both prominent 
protests and a well-publicized tragedy – David Sanes was killed in April of 1999, and the hearings 
were in part called as a response to the burgeoning anti-bombing campaigns in Vieques, Puerto 
Rico, and within the Puerto Rican diaspora in the U.S.59 
Testifying before that committee, Vice Admiral William J. Fallon, the Commander of the 
Second Fleet, echoed what Secretary Hidalgo had said nearly two decades before, calling Vieques 
57 Ibid., 4. 
58 McCaffrey, Military Power and Popular Protest, 81-84.
59 For an excellent analysis of the role played by the diaspora, and the role Vieques played in “transnational” identity formation for 
Puerto Ricans, see Amílcar Antonio Barreto, Vieques, the Navy, and Puerto Rican Politics (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 
2002).
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“the only place available to East Coast forces which affords them a place to conduct training… 
There are very few places left in which we can conduct live ordnance training, and this is the premier 
and principal location on the East Coast.60
As with Hidalgo, Admiral Fallon addressed the ongoing complaints of protesters by denying 
the ill effects of the Navy presence on the people of Vieques:
I also would like to make the point that I personally feel that our operations down 
there do not pose a hazard to the civilian population of this island. In fact, if we 
thought that there were significant hazards to the people, we would not be doing this 
training. The primary reason we do train at Vieques with live ordnance is that this 
particular range is particularly well-suited to that, at minimum risk to people. 
If one were to look at the island makeup…the impact area where all ordnance 
training is conducted is at the far eastern end of the island. It is less than 3 percent of 
the total land area of the island. There is a buffer zone of almost 10 miles, totally 
uninhabited, between the target range and the nearest population center on the 
island. The water areas around the northeast and south, also uninhabited, provide the 
best possible safety buffer to civilian lives. So we feel that the operations are, in fact, 
safely conducted.61
It is clear from Admiral Mullen’s testimony that he and the protesters identified questions of 
“safety” quite differently, and this difference is illustrative of the Navy’s overall failure to respond to 
demands for remuneration. Essentially, the Admiral’s definition of safety is based on protecting 
Viequenses from accidents like the one that killed David Sanes. But talk of buffer zones and safe 
conduct does not address in any meaningful way the actual complaints of the Vieques protests – 
Admiral Mullen did not address environmental destruction or its correspondent health effects. He 
talks about the “uninhabited waters” as though they are a source of security, instead of a source of 
contamination. From this conception of the Navy’s obligations to the people of Vieques flows quite 
naturally the Navy’s denial of its accountability after 2003. 
60 Vieques and the future of the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility: hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the 
Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress, first session, September 
22 and October 19, 1999: p. 4.
61 Ibid., 5-6.
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Compared to Secretary Hidalgo’s essential belligerence in the face of the fishermen’s 
protests, though, Admiral Mullen did acknowledge some legitimacy in the protesters’ grievances. He 
told the committee:
We recognize that our operations impinge on their livelihood down on the island. 
We would like to meet with the people. We would like to address not only the 
National security imperatives for continuing our training on the island, but we would 
also like to help enhance the quality of life of the people and their economic well-
being, and with your assistance we look forward to doing that.62
Mullen’s apparent concern for the economic well-being of Viequenses was not as generous as it 
looks at first glance. During the period of the 1999-2003 movement, the Navy regularly tied 
promises of economic and aid packages to the islanders’ continued support for the bombing and 
landing exercises. Most explicitly, the Navy offered a $50 million aid package if Viequenses would 
vote for the continuation of bombing in 2001 while simultaneously holding the supposed economic 
benefits of Roosevelt Roads hostage during negotiations.
The poverty on Vieques, and the Navy’s substantial share of that responsibility, are crucial 
components of the reparations debate for the island. Admiral Mullen’s admission that the Navy 
“impinges the livelihood” of Viequenses is welcome, even if it was more of a response to the 
previous round of protests than it was to the round he was ostensibly addressing. But Mullin’s 
expressed concern about the economic well-being of Viequenses and the Navy’s role as a good 
neighbor to the island’s residents was nothing new. Among the “resolutions” to the Fishermen’s 
War was the Fortín Accord, a 1983 agreement between Puerto Rico Governor Carlos Romero-
Barceló and James Goodrich, Reagan’s Secretary of the Navy. As Amílcar Antonio Baretto explains, 
the accord served as a foundation for Admiral Mullen’s testimony sixteen years later:
One of the top priorities outlined in the agreement was the navy’s commitment to 
find civilian industries willing to locate plants on Vieques. The navy made no 
commitment to withdraw from Vieques…At the time, many viewed the navy’s 
signature as victory for the people of Vieques. Those cheering this understanding 
62 Ibid. 
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forgot one important point: the U.S. Navy’s commitment to improving Vieques’s 
economic development was institutional self-interest designed to prolong the use of 
this island as a bombing range.63
By the time Mullen was making similar promises, a decade and a half with no notable improvement 
in the Viequense economic situation had passed. Critically, because the Navy leadership always saw 
their role in the economic development of Vieques as tied to their ability to continue bombing 
unimpeded (and even then, considering the results, did not take that role very seriously,) the end of 
bombing exercises and the closure of Roosevelt Roads in 2003 seemed to the Navy to represent the 
end of their obligations.
One of the Navy officials during the transition was Charles D. Swift, who served as legal 
counsel for the commanding officer at Roosevelt Roads.64 In 2011, he was interviewed as part of the 
Rule of Law Oral History Project at Columbia University’s Center for Oral History. Swift’s insights 
are invaluable in that they present an analysis of events during the transition that had not previously 
been reflected in the public record. Of particular note is that, while he is certainly more candid than 
any of the officers testifying before congressional committees, he maintains the position that the 
Navy has no extraordinary responsibilities in Vieques after 2003. 
The prominent position of Secretary Hidalgo, Admiral Mullen, and the US Navy and US 
Government generally, was that Vieques had crucial and irreplaceable value for military readiness. 
Swift disagrees. When Swift was asked how severe the loss of Vieques was for the Navy, he 
responded:
Nonexistent. That was the funny part. There was a lot of pride in it. It bothered me 
underneath. I knew that Vieques was doomed long before. I understood it a year into 
my tenure… Vieques was not cleared to drop for GPS. There was a discussion of 
whether we could ever clear it and whether we would need a new environmental 
impact statement, which no one wanted to do.65
63 Barreto, Vieques, the Navy, and Puerto Rican Politics, 33.
64 Swift would go on to gain prominence for representing Guantanamo detainee Salim Hamdan before the Supreme Court. 
65 Swift,82.
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Swift’s interpretation that importance of losing Vieques as “nonexistent” for the Navy, which he 
says is related to changing military technology and the increasing irrelevance of landing exercises and 
the clearances needed for new GPS-based bombing systems, contradicts nearly everything the Navy 
said before and during the protests. Swift explains why the Navy would decline to pursue GPS 
bombing for reasons beyond just changing technology:
Here’s the problem. If you drop at thirty thousand feet and the GPS doesn’t work, 
you put Saint Thomas at risk, and no one was going to risk putting a bomb into a 
cruise ship. For those of you who still believe there is cancer on Vieques, please 
check the prevailing winds. The prevailing winds don’t blow toward downtown 
Esperanza. The prevailing winds blow to St. Thomas. 66
As in the public statements of Secretary Hidalgo and Admiral Mullen, Swift misrepresents or 
misunderstands the arguments for the navy’s responsibility for health problems in Vieques, which 
have little if anything to do with prevailing winds. His opinion that the risk of blowing up cruise 
ships in the Virgin Islands was too great to accept and that the Navy would have transitioned away 
from live-fire exercises on Vieques regardless of the protests is contradicted by another statement 
from the interview, in which he provides an incredibly candid explanation for Vieques’ value to the 
U.S. military, broadly speaking:
Every president says it's unconstitutional, but they passed the War Powers Act. Part 
of the War Powers Act is about deployment from the continental United States. We 
are not in the continental United States in Puerto Rico. It's a territory, so it doesn’t 
count as the United States. It's not a state, so you can do some deployments into 
hostile areas without telling anyone. Before we've had SOC South in Panama for the 
same reason, so we could do things without telling Congress or limiting it to the gang 
of four. These are good things.





Swift takes the position, later in the interview, that the Viequense protesters were unsophisticated in 
demanding that the Navy stop the bombing, which he submits would have happened anyway, and 
should have instead used their position to insist on environmental clean-up.68 It is the closest he got 
to suggesting the possibility of reparation.
The statements from Hidalgo, Mullen, and Swift provide insight into the Navy’s mindset 
regarding their own accountability for the social crises in Vieques, and they all demonstrate a kind of 
tunnel vision on the issue. Hidalgo and Mullen offer the infeasible position that the Navy did more 
good than bad for the people of Vieques, and Swift denies that “there is cancer on Vieques” 
outright. Since 2003, the Navy has maintained this same position, which seems inherited from the 
arguments it made in 1980 and again in 1999. 
The ATSDR
While the Navy’s position has remained constant, it has been aided in its more recent denials 
of responsibility by the issuance of the three ATSDR reports in 2003, 2009, and 2013.69 The reports 
consistently fail to discover links between military activities and health problems on the island, while 
nevertheless acknowledging both. 
On October 15, 2015, I attended a conference held at the University of Puerto Rico-Río 
Piedras. The conference featured panel discussions on the subject of public health in Vieques from 
Viequense residents, as well as both government and independent scientists, and politicians from 
both Washington and San Juan.70 Much of the work done by the independent scientists establishes 
clear linkages between the presence of toxic levels of heavy metals in samples taken from 
68 Ibid., 86-87
69 All the ATSDR reports are available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/sites/vieques/overview.html
70 Video of the conference in its entirety is available here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lc1ava8EPoM
29
Viequenses and their myriad health problems. Again, though, neither the presence of those heavy 
metals nor the health problems are disputed by either the Navy or the ATSDR. For that reason, the 
presentations that speak most directly to the cause of reparations were the ones that specifically 
challenged the ATSDR reports’ inability to discover a cause-and-effect relationship between the 
toxic heavy metals and military activities.
Dr. Carmen Ortiz Roque, a member of the Independent Scientific Commission on Vieques 
and a professor at the Colegio de Médicos Cirujanos de Puerto Rico (College of Physicians and 
Surgeons of Puerto Rico), referred to a published paper in which she and a colleague had analyzed 
mercury concentrations in Viequense women of reproductive age.71 The paper discovered 
extraordinarily high levels of mercury in its subjects (26.8% of the Viequense subjects exceeded 
recommended levels of mercury, compared to 6.6% in mainland Puerto Rico and 7% in the United 
States,) noting that “Mercury is among the 102 violations to effluent water quality parameters 
committed by the US Navy in the coast of Vieques. No other source of mercury contamination has 
been identified in that island.”72
During their respective presentations, two different presenters – Dr. Jorge Colón of UPR’s 
Department of Chemistry and Dr. Daniel Colón-Ramos of Yale School of Medicine, both of whom 
are members of the Independent Scientific Commission – noted that the ATSDR reports rely in part 
on studies paid for by the Navy, and conducted by CH2M Hill, a contractor that oversees the 
Navy’s post-2003 clean-up efforts, and has a long history of unethical and environmentally 
destructive behavior.73  
71 Carmen Ortiz Roque and Yadiris López-Rivera, “Mercury contamination in reproductive age women in a Caribbean island: 
Vieques.” Journal of Epidemiol Community Health (2004): 756-757.
72 Ibid., 756.
73 Most famously, CH2M Hill built trailers for Katrina refugees that contained formaldehyde and exposed the refugees to toxic fumes. 
A class action suit related to the trailers was settled in 2012. 
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Dr. Colón-Ramos, besides criticizing the ATSDR for using CH2M Hill studies specifically, 
criticized them for relying on data that had been collected by other sources more generally, for 
giving recommendations without data to back them up, and for using unreliable data. On balance, 
Dr. Colón-Ramos said, “it offends me to call what the ATSDR does ‘science.’”74 
The principle achievement of the ATSDR reports has been to validate the post-2003 version 
of the Navy’s long-standing denials of their culpability for the various crises in Vieques. With the 
bombing over, the Navy no longer has to defend its presence as actually good for the people of 
Vieques, or even to offer economic development as a protection racket. Now, with the help of the 
ATSDR reports, the Navy can simply fall back on the farfetched defense that no evidence links the 
decades of bombing to the presence of toxic levels of heavy metals on the island. 
The bad science of the ATSDR reports, and their seeming collusion with elements close to 
the Navy, are scandalous on their own. For the sake of reparations for Vieques, though, they have 
been catastrophic. The case for reparations is much more difficult to make when a supposedly 
independent agency validates the Navy’s argument that, while the facts of cancer and poverty may 
be conceded, the truth of culpability may not. 
Part Three: Vieques Reparations in Practice
Compensation, and I think that’s the way Congressmen are looking at it, but compensation is not the solution to our 
health problems…I’m sorry, John, but compensation is one thing and God knows this island deserves compensation 
but it is not our solution. What we have to demand here are clinics and treatments and follow up on complications and 
health.
-Myrna Pagán75
74 UPR Conference, translation by the author. 
75 Quoted in Torres-Vélez, “The Hidden Wounds of Vieques”: 154.
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Pagán, a Viequense resident, said these words during the 2003 reparation debates that ended in the 
decision to go forward with the lawsuit that would become Sanchez. Addressing John Arthur Eaves, 
Jr., the lawyer who would become lead counsel in the class action suit, she expresses concern about 
the nature of an individually-focused class action suit, and about monetary compensation as the only 
form of reparation for Vieques. Victor Torres-Vélez, who was present for those debates, echoes 
Pagán’s worries, pointing out that many Viequenses who are seemingly healthy now are likely to fall 
ill from bombardment-related causes later, and that the construction of medical infrastructure is of 
more value than monetary payments.76
Many foundational questions about reparations generally, and about the specifics of 
reparations for Viequenses, emerged from those immediate post-bombing debates. The 
intergenerational nature of victimization in Vieques, combined with the non-fixed category of 
victims, lend themselves to the suggestion that reparations for Viequenses should be collective, 
instead of or in addition to individual. Within a human rights framework, the notion that collective 
reparations can and should be complementary to individual ones is widely accepted. The ICTJ 
published a relevant discussion of collective reparations in a 2007 policy paper:
Collective reparations are focused on delivering a benefit to people that suffered 
from human rights violations as a group…[T]hey might address violations such as 
bombings or a destruction of villages that had the intention of terrorizing a whole 
population, affecting means of subsistence, dismantling organizations or destroying 
public trust among residents. In such contexts, collective reparations may offer an 
effective response to damage to community infrastructure, identity and trust.77
While it would be easy for one to get caught up on the question of “intention,” for the Navy, the 
known effect of their bombing was economic, environmental, and health devastation.78 The ICTJ 
report argues for a combination of collective and individual reparations in most situations, as 
76 Ibid., 154-155.
77 International Center for Transitional Justice, “Reparations in Theory and Practice.” Reparative Justice Series (2007). p.5. 
https://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Global-Reparations-Practice-2007-English.pdf
78 Much of the next three paragraphs are paraphrased from a term paper I wrote for Prof. David Scott in Fall 2014.
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occurred in places like Timor Leste, Chile, and Peru.79 In Vieques, lawyers involved in the class-
action suit framed the individual reparations as sufficient in themselves. Torres-Vélez quotes Eaves 
as counseling, “When you have money you have a choice. When you are sick you know what your 
options are…Doctors will come if they receive compensation because they will be able to support 
their families. Then they will come to Vieques.”80 This is, as both Torres-Vélez and the residents of 
Vieques (including Myrna Pagán) who are quoted in his work point out, not the same as building a 
hospital and medical infrastructure on the island.81 In short, offering the means to pay for private 
doctors or the monetary incentive for private doctors to come to the island only for the Viequenses 
who are participants in the class-action suit accomplishes nothing in terms of alleviating the 
underlying collective harms to public health. 
Thomas McCarthy, arguing for black reparations, makes a pertinent argument in favor of 
collective compensation and reparation:
A recurring objection to the tort model of reparation is that under it compensation 
settles the matter once and for all - so that, for instance, if racial inequalities persisted 
thereafter, there would be no further recourse. Adapting distributive justice 
principles to reparations purposes, as I am proposing, sets the standard of reparation 
in terms of doing "about as well as" or being "more nearly equal to" other groups of 
citizens and thus blunts that objection.82
McCarthy says his argument for collective compensation is “not a putatively objective search for 
monetary equivalents but a democratic deliberation upon the requirements of equal justice.”83 To 
apply that deliberation to the Viequense case supports the assertion that the genuine requirement of 
justice in Vieques is collective. The harm in Vieques is indiscriminate and collective – all those who 
lived or live on the island have been exposed to the environmental catastrophes from the naval 
79 ICTJ, “Reparations in Theory and Practice”, 5-7.
80 Torres-Vélez, “The Hidden Wounds of Vieques”, 156.
81 Ibid., 154-157.
82 Thomas McCarthy, “Coming to Terms with our Past, Part II: On the Morality and Politics of Reparations for Slavery.” Political 
Theory 32, no. 6 (2004): 756.
83 Ibid. 
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bombing and, by extension, their horrific health effects. This is not to say that there is no room at all 
for individual monetary payments – as the ICTJ makes clear, a combination of both is often 
desirable. It is instead simply to say that McCarthy’s “recurring objection” could certainly apply in 
the Viequense case. It would not be justice for the Navy, even of its own free will, to hand over cash 
payments to select Viequenses and consider its debt paid. 
Nevertheless, the decision was ultimately made by Viequenses to go ahead with the class 
action suit that would become Sanchez. To date, it is the strongest and most substantial case for 
reparations to have been made for Vieques. Its dismissal by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, while 
undoubtedly a disappointment to the plaintiffs and a step back in the overall movement to secure 
reparations, offers an opportunity for a fresh look at how reparations can and should be achieved. 
Understanding the arguments put forth in Sanchez, and the reasons given by the majority of the court 
for its inadmissibility, is essential to addressing those questions.
Sanchez v. United States84
The Sanchez case was filed in 2007 in the District Court of Puerto Rico. Its claims for 
restitution were made under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), a law that establishes exceptions 
to the principle of sovereign immunity – in short, the FTCA outlines the circumstances in which 
U.S. citizens can sue the government. In 2010, the Puerto Rican district court concluded that “the 
Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction in the instant case due to the strong presumption for 
the application of the discretionary function exception, particularly as to the repercussions of 
military operations upon the adjacent or subsequent civilian population, which has been recognized 
84 Much of this sub-section is paraphrased from a term paper I wrote for Professor Jon Bush in Spring 2015.
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in this and in other circuits, including in the context of the Navy's operations on Vieques.”85 The 
issue of “discretionary function” would arise again in the appeal. 
The district court, while finding that the lawsuit was inadmissible for the aforementioned 
reasons, nevertheless took the issue of the Viequense health crisis seriously. The court notes that its 
decision was made “despite the deeply ‘simpatico,’ or sympathetic, nature of Plaintiffs' claims against 
the Navy, whose operations on Vieques have allegedly caused them innumerous potentially severe 
health damage.”86 The language, though stunted by the legal language of “alleged” causation, is 
remarkable for its expression of open sympathy for the plight of Viequenses.
The plaintiffs appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals. Once again, their case was 
dismissed on the basis of discretionary function and sovereign immunity, but once again, the court 
rejected the Viequenses’ claim for action while still acknowledging the severity of the community’s 
health crisis:
Nonetheless, while the majority's view is that the dismissal of the suit must be 
affirmed, and the dissent disagrees, the plaintiffs' pleadings, taken as true, raise 
serious health concerns. The government has acknowledged the existence of these 
concerns. The majority and the dissent agree that these issues should be brought to 
the attention of Congress. The Clerk of Court is instructed to send a copy of this 
opinion to the leadership of both the House and Senate.87
Although the language of the decision remains ambiguous – the government acknowledges health 
concerns, which is easy enough to do – it is nevertheless an important high-level recognition of 
Vieques’ health crisis, which should be valuable to future assertions of the need for remedy. While 
the Navy has and will surely continue to point to the conflicting evidence surrounding their direct 
responsibility for the ill health of Viequenses, the facts of the health problems faced by people on 
the island and their paucity of health care resources remain. Both the district court and court of 
appeals acknowledge this.
85 Sanchez v. United States, No. 09-CV-1260, 707 F.Supp.2d 216, 231, 2010 WL 1626118, p.
86 Ibid. 
87  Sanchez ex rel. D.R.-S. v. United States, 671 F.3d 86 (1st Cir. 2012) [2012 BL 38863], p. 13
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The majority’s decision in Sanchez is largely based on its finding that the Navy’s 
bombardment of Vieques was covered as a discretionary function, and by extension ineligible for a 
sovereign immunity exception under the FTCA. The plaintiffs anticipated this objection, but the 
Court rejected their arguments:
The plaintiffs…assert that the Navy is susceptible to suit and acted beyond its 
discretion because it allegedly (1) violated mandatory directives concerning water 
pollution issued pursuant to the Clean Water Act (CWA), (2) violated a pair of 
permits, which are not part of the record, that purportedly forbid firing depleted 
uranium bullets on Vieques; (3) violated unidentified internal regulations, policies, 
directives, and orders; and (4) failed to comply with a purported duty to warn the 
plaintiffs about pollution.
The district court rejected these arguments as well as several others not raised on 
appeal. We affirm the dismissal with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.88
The complaints numbered two and three above did not contain sufficient documentation to be 
proven, and are therefore not given a great deal of attention in the majority’s decision. The court’s 
findings on theories one and four are worthy of attention, as they draw on the more substantial and 
theoretical legal considerations in the case. That is, they address the FTCA and the issue of the 
discretionary function exception at length, and seem therefore to provide the clearest picture of 
whether Viequenses can secure reparation via an FTCA lawsuit going forward. The plaintiffs’ 
contention that the Navy’s activities on and around Vieques were not covered as discretionary 
function because they violated the Clean Water Act hinges on the existence of a permit granted the 
Navy by the Environmental Protection Agency in 1984.89 That permit:
required that the Navy maintain water concentrations of certain compounds below 
the higher of (1) specific numerical requirements and (2) natural background 
concentration levels. The permit stated that “at no time shall the maximum values 
contained in the effluent exceed the water quality standards after mixing with the 
receiving water.”90 
88 Ibid., p.2. Original citations omitted. 
89 Ibid., p. 4.
90 Ibid. 
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The plaintiffs cited memos and studies that demonstrated that those requirements had not 
been met, but the court found that there could be no FTCA claims based on the Clean Water Act 
because it was outside Congress’s intent when the act was passed.91 Judge Torruella, a Circuit Judge 
from Puerto Rico, writing his dissent in Sanchez, denies the relevance of congressional intent as 
regards the Clean Water Act, pointing out that the suit has been filed not under that Act, but under 
the FTCA:
Furthermore, this is a suit under the FTCA, which only has one exception that is 
arguably relevant to the case before us, the discretionary function exception of 28 
U.S.C. § 2680(a). The issue in this case is not whether the CWA or NEPA created a 
private cause of action for damages… Indeed, the CWA, NEPA, and other 
regulations are of relevance only in determining whether the Navy comes within the 
discretionary function exception. This Court is bound by the higher authority 
of Gaubert and Berkovitz, which establish the inapplicability of the discretionary 
function exception when there are mandatory legal requirements, such as exist in the 
present case by reason of court rulings (Romero-Barceló), federal statutes (e.g., NEPA 
and CWA), and specific permit standards (e.g., the NPDES permit), all of which the 
Navy has allegedly disregarded to the claimed prejudice of Plaintiffs.92
The other argument made by the Sanchez plaintiffs was that the Navy allowed fishermen and cattle 
ranchers to conduct their work in areas contaminated by heavy metals, thus failing in the duty to 
warn Viequenses about the presence of dangerous toxins in those areas. The failure of that duty is, 
according to the plaintiffs’ claim, just that – a failure of a duty, and by definition not a discretionary 
act. 
For the majority, the plaintiffs did not provide a sufficient source for the duty to warn. The 
plaintiffs’ sources were 1) a provision in the Navy’s Vieques range manual that prohibits bombing 
during certain hours in order to allow fishermen to retrieve their traps, and 2) an academic article 
that asserts without citation that the Navy allowed cattle to graze on the bombing ranges.93 The 
91 Ibid., p. 6-8.
92 Ibid., p.21
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majority states that “The source of this alleged non-discretionary duty to warn suffers from 
vagueness and indeterminacy,” and so does not create a duty to inform at all.94
Further, the majority makes several important points about the discretionary necessity of the 
military not disclosing certain activities to the public, and cites a variety of precedents wherein the 
Navy’s informing or not informing the public about its actions was decided to be discretionary.95 
Judge Torruella’s dissent addresses these points at length, finding similarities to previous cases that 
the majority dismissed as different, and basing his argument on the notion that the Navy was 
violating both Puerto Rican and federal law, in addition to its own policy, when making these 
“discretionary decisions.”96 Torruella passionately argued for the necessity of military accountability:
I find it hard to see how there is any reasonable or permissible policy analysis that 
could justify the Navy's failure to warn Plaintiffs of the known dangers created by 
the Navy's violation of the laws and regulations applicable to its conduct…In our 
constitutional system of government the military is subordinate to the civil 
authority. Thus, whatever discretion the military has, it is not without bounds. When 
necessary, the courts have stepped in to affirm that there are limits on what can be 
done in the name of national security. I cannot countenance a legal concept or 
theory that would give the military qua military carte blanche license to harm U.S. 
citizens through its negligent actions without any consequence.97
As powerful and appealing as Judge Torruella’s argument is, it is possible he is arguing against a 
straw man here. It is not at all clear from the majority’s decision that it disagrees – its contention is 
not that the Navy’s discretion is “without bounds” or that the military has “carte blanche license to 
harm U.S. citizens without any consequence,” but rather that the bounds within which military 
discretion exists include the actions the Navy took in Vieques.
93 Ibid., p. 4. The cited article is A. Massol-Deyá, et al., Trace Elements Analysis in Forage Samples from a U.S. Navy Bombing Range (Vieques, 
Puerto Rico), 2 Int'l J. Envtl. Res. & Pub. Health 263, 264 (2005)
94 Ibid., p. 10
95 Ibid., 10-13.
96 Ibid., 20-23.
97 Ibid., 23. Citations omitted. 
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Indeed, the order to send the decision to Congress demonstrates not only that the majority 
takes the harms perpetrated against Vieques seriously, but that they take Viequense claims for 
reparation seriously. They only believe that the law as it exists does not provide for them, and that 
the legislature is the appropriate venue to secure them. The court’s dismissal of the case “with 
prejudice,” anyway, complicates the possibility of following the class action route to reparation, 
however. Rather than modifying the existing claims in Sanchez and trying the case again, the plaintiffs 
would need to find harms for which there was sufficient evidence under the FTCA. The First 
Circuit’s decision on the matter is final, as the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the plaintiffs’ 
appeal in 2013. This is one reason that a political rather than legal settlement might be preferable for 
Viequenses.
The Inter-American Petition98
The legal challenge that followed Sanchez, in fact, bears in mind the greater possibilities for a 
political solution. In September of 2013, three lawyers, along with the Alianza de Mujeres 
Viequenses (Viequense Women’s Alliance), filed a petition before the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights alleging human rights violations against residents of Vieques by the United States 
government. Claims before international bodies alleging violations of Puerto Rican human rights are 
not novel – there has been testimony to that effect before the UN Decolonization Committee on a 
near-annual basis for decades. The petition in question is, in that tradition, a meaningful alternative 
to the remedies sought under Sanchez, appealing as it does to international human rights law rather 
than the entangled domestic considerations of the FTCA and sovereign immunity. Any conclusions 
reached by the Inter-American petition are neither binding nor enforceable in the United States, but 
98 Some of this sub-section is paraphrased from a term paper I wrote for Prof. Jon Bush in Spring 2015.
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the petition serves as an opportunity to put both domestic and international pressure on the U.S. 
government to fulfill its duty of redress in Vieques.
The Inter-American petition reframes the arguments in Sanchez as violations of established 
human rights, including the rights to life, health, access to information, and judicial remedies.99 The 
petition adds claims of violations of the rights to free movement, residence, work, and fair 
remuneration, based on various policies enacted by the Navy during their 60-year presence in 
Vieques.
The petition takes an expansive approach to identifying the Navy’s violations of Viequenses’ 
right to life.100 In addition to the more explicit and obvious threats to the right to life in Vieques 
posed by the environmental devastation and its resulting health effects, the petition notes that “In 
spite of the gravity of the situation, the State’s inadequate responsiveness shows an evident disregard 
for the human right to life in contravention of its international obligations under the American 
Declaration.”101 This is a critical point to make. Even focusing on reparations only for the human 
rights violations perpetrated as a result of Navy occupation, the temporal question is broader than it 
first appears. The Navy is responsible for reparation not just for its actions from 1941-2003, but also 
for its inactions in the ensuing years. The end of the bombing does not equate to the end of Navy 
responsibility.
The petition further expands on the violation of the right to life in Vieques. Significantly, it 
points out that both the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court for Human 
Rights:
have also interpreted the scope of protection of the right to life as to include living 
conditions that ensure a decent existence…The right to life is not limited to the mere 
99Inter-American Petition. 
100 The right to life, as it is commonly understood in human rights literature, is actually the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life. It 
is hard to imagine a delineation more arbitrary than residence in a particular geographic space.
101 Inter-American Petition, 37.
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existence as a human being, but extends to the conditions created or permitted by 
the States to make effective the enjoyment of this right with dignity.102
Arguments related to the right to health extend naturally from this conception of the right to life. 
The conception that the right to life required not just keeping people physically alive but providing 
dignified conditions of living is useful in framing the discussion of reparations for Vieques because it 
helps to identify and define the harms suffered by Viequenses. It is not only that they die of cancer 
and other maladies at extraordinary rates, to put it one way, is it also that they live with cancer and 
other maladies at extraordinary rates. 
There are, of course, strengths and weaknesses worth acknowledging in the international law 
approach. Should the petition lead to a decision by the Inter-American Commission favorable to the 
Viequenses, the moral authority and relative political weight of international customary law would be 
behind a program of reparations. Though that weight – the weight of soft law – is not the most 
practicable, to say the least, it nevertheless gives supporters of Vieques reparations in the United 
States a tool and the Congress a political incentive to fulfill their obligations of redress so as to make 
clear that it is fulfilling its international human rights obligations. 
On the other hand, it is much more difficult in a legal setting to come up with a temporally 
comprehensive settlement – one that addresses the equally important harms of the past, present, and 
future. However, the understanding of Sanchez as an exhaustion of domestic legal remedies is 
important to the framing of the entire Viequense question. That interpretation, if it is correct, 
reinforces the argument that the best and possibly only avenue by which reparations can be achieved 
is political. Once again, there are clear advantages to that approach. It is perhaps more feasible, given 
the power dynamics, to gather a coalition and put political pressure on Congress than it is to win a 
legal case. It is also more likely that a political settlement could include a comprehensive, collective-
102 Ibid., 38-39.
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minded reparations package rather than being focused on the monetary payments of a class-action 
suit. 
Elements of a Reparation Policy for Vieques
In the event of a legislative solution, one seemingly obvious measure for Congress to take 
would be either an amendment to the FTCA or new legislation opening the door for FTCA claims 
for Viequenses specifically, or for environmental damage and public health claims against the 
military more generally.103 There is precedent for expanding FTCA coverage to incorporate 
previously unincorporated claimants, and any substantial movement of public interest on the 
Vieques case and/or other similar ones could push that kind of reform.104
Another possible avenue for Congress would be to bypass the FTCA altogether and pass a 
reparations bill similar to the one for Japanese-American victims of internment. There are, of course, 
major differences between the situations of Viequenses and that of Japanese-Americans that imply 
very different ways of approaching a reparations bill. For one thing, it was relatively easy to identify 
the victims of internment – payments went to those who were in internment camps and only those 
who were in the camps, which one either was or was not. If the reparation program for Viequenses 
followed the line of Sanchez and addressed the public health crises on the island, the reparations 
would have to go to those who have become sick due to the Navy’s bombardment. Setting aside 
even the previously discussed difficulties of proving the origins of those sicknesses, which would 
itself be a substantial problem, identifying the victims of the bombing of Vieques is much more 
complicated than it was for Japanese-Americans. 
103 The next four paragraphs are paraphrased from a term paper I wrote for Prof. Jon Bush in Spring 2015.
104 See, for example, Anne R. Riley, “United States v. Johnson: Expansion of the Feres Doctrine to Include Servicemembers’ FTCA Suits 
against Civilian Government Employees.” Vanderbilt Law Review 42 (1989): 233-268.
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One potential solution would be to provide compensation for anyone in Vieques who has 
one of the diseases with higher rates than in mainland Puerto Rico, including cancer and 
hypertension, as well as to mothers whose children were born with birth defects or who fell victim 
to the island’s terrible infant mortality rate. The problem with that, clearly, is that many of the 
people who have been victims of the Navy’s activities have died because of it, which is another 
distinguishing feature compared to Japanese-American internees. A better approach might be to 
include kin and heirs of the dead in addition to the currently sick. That approach, though, suggests 
an even more comprehensive one. The “heirs of the dead,” if that is taken to mean those who died 
of bombardment-related diseases dating back to the beginning of the bombing in 1941 encompasses 
entire generations of Viequense people. As mentioned earlier, too, there are some who are not yet 
sick but will be and some who are not yet born who will be affected. So, the Japanese-American 
model suddenly seems, of all things, insufficient. 
The answers to the question of how reparations should be paid, and who the beneficiaries 
should be, can and must come from Vieques. When it comes to local demands for the “four D’s” of 
demilitarization, decontamination, devolution (return of the lands), and development, what interests 
me for the purposes of this thesis is not exactly how those things should be achieved, but how they 
can or cannot be framed as reparations. 
I do not, for example consider decontamination to be a form of reparation. The agreement 
by which the Navy left Vieques in 2003 included provisions for a comprehensive clean-up of the 
waste left behind. So, environmental clean-up represents merely the fulfilling of a previously 
contracted duty for the Navy, and hardly counts as reparation. On the other hand, there is a strong 
claim for reparation for the years during which the environmental cleanup has been neglected, and 
especially for the additional health problems it has caused. As long as the pollutants from the 
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bombing remain in the Viequense land, water, and air, the catastrophic health effects from the 
bombing are not over. Environmental cleanup is a prerequisite for any reparations aimed at the 
health crisis on the island to be meaningful. It is, in sum, necessary but not sufficient.
Many of the demands for reparation coming from Vieques include some form of land 
restitution. The local advocacy organization Vieques Vive, La Lucha Continua includes “Devolution 
(return of the lands)” as one of its four demands:
We demand the return of all of the land which is currently controlled by the federal 
government -  the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) - and it 
must be restored to the condition in which it was found when it was expropriated in 
the 40s.  Half of the island continues to be restricted to the civilian population.105
Even if the Department of the Interior were to give back all the former Navy land, even after a 
thorough and satisfactory decontamination, it would not be restoring any previously worthwhile 
condition of land ownership on the island but creating a new one. The above demand that the land 
be “restored to the condition in which it was found” at the time of expropriation makes sense as a 
demand for environmental clean-up, but is problematic when it comes to property ownership. 
César Ayala and José Bolívar’s work shows that at the time of the Navy expropriations in 
1941, the vast majority of the land in Vieques was concentrated in the hands of a few rich sugar 
plantation owners.106 In fact, one of the reasons it was so easy for the Navy to expropriate so much 
of Vieques so quickly (and also one of the main points of propaganda mentioned by the Navy when 
defending their actions) was that they only had to settle accounts with a handful of land owners.107 
There has never been a time in Viequense history dating back at least to the arrival of European 
colonizers during which the land of the island was genuinely in the hands of its people. 
105 Vieques Vive, La Lucha Continua Brochure. “The Struggle Continues in Vieques.” Copy in possession of the author.
106 Ayala and Bolívar, Battleship Vieques, chapters 1 and 2. 
107 Ibid.
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This is not to say that Viequense demands for an end to federal ownership of land on the 
island are not legitimate, it is just to say they are not restitution. Despite that, a genuine devolution 
of the lands – one that took into account the economic condition of Viequenses, gave them 
privileged access to ownership, and included built-in barriers to gentrification – could operate as a 
valid and valuable reparation, one that was simultaneously forward and backward-looking.
The provision of proper medical services and a decent medical infrastructure on the island 
would be a critical component of any reparations paid by the US Navy, as it addresses a direct 
problem caused by their presence.108 It would not be wholly sufficient, however, to do so. A hospital 
that residents could not afford would be useless as reparation or otherwise, and providing the same 
paltry services in an updated facility would not achieve anything approaching the health needs of the 
people on the island. 
For this, it is useful to adapt Boris Bittker’s argument against social welfare programs as an 
alternative to reparations for African Americans. For Bittker, the mere fact of alleviating the 
conditions of inequality does not “compensate for the deprivations of the past.”109 Reparations that 
genuinely addressed the health problem on Vieques would need to provide not just health 
infrastructure but health care. There is an international precedent to support this. The UN’s Basic 
Principles on Reparation include rehabilitation as one of the five forms of reparation, and specify 
that it refers to medical and psychological care along with legal and social services.110 Provision of 
health care as a form of reparation has occurred in numerous transitional justice contexts, including 
in Chile, Peru, and Sierra Leone. In the U.S., the settlement of the class action lawsuit brought by 
Vietnam Veterans for exposure to Agent Orange (a particularly salient parallel given the use of that 
108 Versions of the next two paragraphs first appeared in a term paper I wrote for Prof. David Scott in Fall 2014.
109 Boris Bittker, The Case for Black Reparations (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973): 134.
110 United Nations, “Basic Principles and Guidelines on Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law.” December 16, 2005. Article IX, Par. 22. 
The other four forms of reparation are restitution, compensation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-recurrence, all of which are 
relevant to the Viequense case to some degree. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/RemedyAndReparation.aspx 
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chemical in Vieques) included not just monetary remuneration, but also created the Class Assistance 
program, which provided, among other things, counseling and medical care to veterans.111
Reparations for Vieques, in sum, should include compensation as well as programs dedicated 
to the rehabilitation of Viequenses’ health, environment, and economy. It should be active rather 
than passive, and provide services in addition to monetary redress. It must particularly take Vieques’ 
precarious economic situation into account by guaranteeing access to health services regardless of 
people’s ability to afford them or their insurance status, as well as by guarding against development 
and tourism projects that provide a tourist destination for mainland Puerto Rican and U.S. expats at 
the expense of the victims of the bombing. It will not do to clean up the beaches outside Esperanza 
so they can become part of a Marriott Resort. 
Conclusion
It is my view that the principle objective toward the end of achieving reparations for the 
people of Vieques is a concerted effort to publicize the extraordinary work being done by activists 
on the ground, and the independent scientists who work tirelessly to counter the pseudo-science 
proffered by the Navy and the ATSDR. If the movements against the bombing during the decades 
of occupation are any indication, and I believe that they are, the plight of Viequenses resonates with 
broad swaths of society. 
The military is, without question, a formidable opponent. In 2013, a class action suit was 
filed by the residents of an upscale, white, politically-connected neighborhood in Washington, DC 
called Spring Valley. The area had been used for toxic waste storage by the U.S. Army in the 1930s, 
and the residents of the neighborhood filed suit, just as Viequenses did, under the FTCA and lost. 112 
111 A summary of the Agent Orange Settlement Fund can be found here: http://www.benefits.va.gov/compensation/claims-
postservice-agent_orange-settlement-settlementFund.asp
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It is tempting for one to look at the Spring Valley case and wonder, if environmental justice from 
the American military is not possible for people in that neighborhood, what hope 10,000 
geographically and politically isolated Puerto Ricans have. 
Much the same could have been, and was, said in 1999 about the hope that protesters 
building camps on beaches could bring about the end of bombing in a place the Navy insisted was 
irreplaceable for its purposes. Given the pan-political support for Vieques 15 years ago, this seems 
difficult but not unsurmountable. 
Quite simply, the Navy and the government of the United States owe Viequenses 
reparations – not merely money for development, or improvements to the clinic on the island, or a 
long-delayed cleanup of the six decades’ worth of shells and toxins the Navy left behind in 2003, but 
reparations that acknowledge the harm done, and aim to repair it. For David Sanes, and for the 
many who have already died from Navy-related cancer and other diseases, it is too late. There can 
never be perfect justice – no one can bring back the dead, or take away the years of suffering from 
the living sick. There is, nevertheless, a moral imperative for the United States to clean up both its 
literal and figurative mess, not because Viequenses are U.S. citizens, but because they are human 
beings.
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